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During the last few years, Intelligent Transportation System 
(ITS) has been progressed at a rapid rate, which aimed to 
improve the transportation activities in the terms of the safety 
and efficiency. According to many issues with the traditional 
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANET), some efforts are 
made to merge the VANET with the cloud technology. This 
work proposes the VANET based on the cloud (V2Cloud), 
and designs a security model framework that is hosted on the 
cloud to manage the security services, and provide a secure 
VANET communication between the different entities e.g. 
vehicles, authorities and etc. This security model framework 
is called VANET Security as a Service (VSaaS).  
Our works will presented in a set of two papers. In this first 
one, it presents VSaaS design and architecture in order to 
show that the VSaaS fulfills the VANET's security 
requirements, and protects the VANET against the different 
types of attacks. The second paper will present the progress 
towards the implementation and the security analysis of the 
proposed architecture, along with the results of the 
performance of  the security overhead for the secure Vehicle 
Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent by vehicles to 
the cloud as a coarse-grained information.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years, Intelligent Transportation System 
(ITS) has been progressed at a rapid rate, which aimed to 
improve the transportation activities in terms of safety and 
efficiency. In traditional way, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) 
communications and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) 
communications are the main components of the ITS 
architecture. Communication between vehicles is often 
referred to Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANET) and it has 
many advantages as reducing the cars' accidents, minimizing 
the traffic jam, reducing the fuel consumption and emissions 
and etc [1]. 
In spite of all the efforts which had been made in recent years 
in the field of VANET and its security, researchers still 
depend directly on the existence of the Road Side Units 
(RSUs), and the local Certified Authorities (CAs) to provide 
VANET services including the security services. According to 
our survey on the previous related works, this dependency is 
facing many problems as, 
 The availability issues: the RSUs which rarely exist in 
the highway roads and rural areas causes the services 
such as security services, which are available only in 
limited regions. Also, making these services available in 
different areas needs additional costs and efforts to 
deploy new RSUs, and connect both of the RSUs and the 
authorities into a single IP network.  
 As to business viewpoint, RSUs deployment is costly.  
 There is a need to a central management architecture to 
ensure the availability of the services when a vehicle 
moves from a region to another. Also, there is a need to 
mechanisms to make a trust between RSUs.  
 These RSUs are not efficient when the number of nodes 
(vehicles) is very large. It consumes channel bandwidth 
and effects network performance.  
 Highly computations are needed in the vehicles to 
analyze the collected data and produce fine human 
readable information.  
 Traditional VANET is not suitable for the cheaper 
vehicles, which lack of proper hardware and sensors to 
participate into VANET and make its benefits.  
A number of authors pointed out in their works that the 
allocated bandwidth exceeds far more than the requirements 
for the VANET safety applications [2]. Thus, the surplus 
bandwidth opens the doors for new opportunities along with 
the normal functionality of the VANET [3]. This gave a 
motivation to Professor Olariu and his colleagues to envision 
a paradigm shift from the traditional VANET to the Vehicular 
Cloud Computing (VCC) by merging the VANET with the 
Cloud Computing [4]. 
Cloud Computing has changed the computation and 
communication mindset by decoupling the computational 
assets from the physical infrastructure, and thereby enabling 
virtualization [5]. The main motivation of the Cloud 
Computing is to "exactly what you need and when you need" 
[6]. 
But till (February/2015), there was no solid architecture or 
general model for VCC as mentioned in [7]. Modern vehicles 
are equipped with permanent Internet by the 3G/4G cellular 
networks which make the cloud request available even when 
the RSUs do not exist. In addition to featuring like on-board 
computational, storage and sensing capabilities, which can be 
thought as a huge farm of computers, remain idle while the 
vehicles stay on the road. Moreover, as every vehicle which 
has Internet connections, it can automatically send the 
messages and the measurements to the cloud, which is 
controlled by authorities like police. It is worth to mention 
that the notation of Cloud Computing idea started from the 
fact of benefiting from it, by using it as an alternative of 
investing in infrastructure, business may find it useful to rent 
the infrastructure, and sometimes the needed software to run 
their applications.  It decreases the number of RSUs as well as 
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giving the vehicles an access to Internet where there is no 
coverage signal of the RSUs [8]. 
In the 12th Annual IEEE Consumer Communication and 
Networking Communication Conference at 2015, Authors in 
[9] mentioned that the secure VANET cloud was a challenge 
task, and there was a need to a compatible security model 
which worked well with the different manufacturers in 
different countries to satisfy the security requirements in the 
VANET communication. The security and privacy challenges, 
which are faced by the standalone VANET and Cloud 
Computing, will remain unchanged even when the two 
technologies are merged to form VANET clouds [6]. 
However, messages (especially safety-messages), which are 
sent by vehicles in VANET, should be authenticated because 
the false or altered messages may lead to bad situations like 
accidents. It should be aware of many challenges in the 
VANET security such as privacy, because the drivers want to 
protect their identities from the others to prevent unauthorized 
tracking, but at the same time, it (the privacy) is in a conflict 
with other security attributes like authentication, which makes 
the design of VANET security model needs extra efforts. 
Moreover, the desired security model for the VANET should 
include authentication, authorization, confidentiality, 
integrity, non-repudiation, revocation and privacy [10]. 
2. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This paper proposes VANET based on the cloud (V2Cloud), 
and designs a cloud security model framework, which is 
called VANET-Security as a Service (VSaaS), to manage the 
security services and provide a secure VANET 
communication between the different entities, e.g. vehicles, 
authorities and etc. Our objectives include: 
 Proposing VANET that depends on cellular networks, 
which act as a gateway to the cloud to get the services 
which include security services.     
 Proposing VANET-Security as a Service (VSaaS) model 
framework. VSaaS is responsible for: 
o Vehicles and authorities registration. 
o Key Management mechanisms, to generate keys for 
different entities and renew the keys when they 
become expired.  
o Authenticating the vehicles and their information 
messages, and authenticate the authorities that 
interacting with the VSaaS too.  
o Vehicle identity identification mechanism, to 
preserve the privacy and enable the traceability done 
only by the trusted authorities that have a 
permission to track vehicles.  
o Providing a security access list to manage the 
permissions among the different entities. 
o Providing a mechanism to revoke the misbehaved 
vehicle and the compromised authority. 
o Providing modules to process the Vehicle 
Information Messages (VIMs), which are sent by 
vehicles as coarse-information messages, and to 
construct fine-information messages, which called 
Traffic Information Messages (TIMs), they are 
disseminated to the vehicles based on their locations 
The rest of this paper is organized as: Section 3 presents 
Related Work, Section 4 presents Security Requirements in 
VANET, Section 5 presents Proposed VSaaS, and finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
3. RELATED WORK 
3.1 VANET Security 
Early papers proposed using pseudonyms to keep the privacy 
into consideration like [11]. Pseudonyms which are defined 
as, many short-lifetime certificates (private-public key pairs) 
installed on each vehicle by an authority, where these 
pseudonyms are used in one period and not be used again. 
This method protects the vehicle identity from being tracked 
by the unauthorized observers, but there is one major problem 
which is the link-ability of the pseudonyms. The attacker may 
identify the target vehicle by linking the previous pseudonym 
with the current one by the temporal or spatial locality. Also 
this approach has many other problems, for example, a large 
storage space is needed at each vehicle. Moreover, including 
the certificate in the safety message leads to larger message 
size and needs more computations to verify every certificate at 
the receiver side. In addition, the big number of certificates in 
the authority of all vehicles, causes a big overhead. For 
liability, the authority should store all these keys to identify 
the misbehaving vehicle. Moreover, the authority needs to 
search in a very huge number of keys and that costs a time. 
The proposed approach in [12] was aimed to reduce the large 
number of pseudonyms which are preloaded on each vehicle. 
The approach reduced the number to a half, on the average. It 
depended on using two certificates: the encryption certificate 
and the signing certificate.  
To solve the link-ability problem, some approaches like in 
[13] proposed a strategy called “hiding in crowd”. In this 
approach, the pseudonyms are updated regularly according to 
the spatial or temporal criteria. But, there are some situations 
that the link-ability is unavoidable in them. One of these 
situations is driving on a long road without junctions. In this 
case, the vehicle can be traced or linked to its group in spite of 
changing its pseudonyms. 
Other approaches like in [14] and [15] try to solve the locality 
problem by using a random silent period among the changing 
of the pseudonyms. In the silent period, vehicle does not 
transmit any message. The period duration should be random 
and short. It is hard to link between vehicles before and after 
the silent period. In this approach, the vehicles must change 
their pseudonyms in adjacent times, but it is not practical, 
because of the need of broadcasting the safety messages 
regularly. 
Another solution in [16] and [17] proposed vehicles belong to 
regions called mix-zones. Each vehicle in the same mix-zone 
changes its pseudonym at the same time. This solution 
decreases the linkage problem, but it depends on the number 
of vehicles in each mix-zone. 
Some researchers employ the Identity-Based Cryptography 
(IBC), where the certificates are not needed for the 
authentication. IBC was proposed in 1984 by Shamir [18]. 
IBC differs from the public key infrastructure (PKI). In 2001, 
Boneh and Franklin [19] introduced the first functional and 
efficient identity-based encryption scheme that was based on 
bilinear pairings property of the elliptic curve. 
 [20] and [21] proposed an approach based on identity-based 
cryptography (IBC), which provides the authentication, non-
repudiation and the privacy. In this approach, each 
pseudonym, which is an anonymous identity, is generated by 
the RSU. The approach enables a single authority to reveal the 
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identity. However, their approach is very dependent on the 
RSUs which may not be reachable or very busy in some cases. 
Other approaches were proposed like in [22], [23], they try to 
avoid the disadvantages of the previous approach. 
Another architecture is to use a group signature approach as in 
[24] and [25]. In this approach, vehicles are arranged into 
groups. Each group has a group manager. The manger is 
responsible of the signing vehicle messages. The identity of 
the vehicle can be detected only by the group manager. 
Another group-based approach is described in [26]. In this 
approach, the group manger signs the vehicles pseudonyms to 
reduce the certificate authority workload. Each vehicle 
produces its pseudonyms and signs its messages. But it is 
difficult to achieve that in a dynamic VANET, because of the 
size, membership revocation and the dynamic membership 
(new nodes enter the group and old nodes leave the group) 
that will increase the complexity and overheads. 
Another architecture which does not depend on pseudonyms 
are described in [27]. This approach uses Hash-base Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC). Before a vehicle sends a 
message, it requests a symmetric key from the RSU to use it 
in the HMAC code. Then, the vehicle signs its message by the 
HMAC code. The receiver vehicle authenticates the message 
from the adjacent RSU. This approach offers anonymity but it 
depends highly on the RSU which may be not available. 
Some papers do not use the pseudonyms or the groups to 
preserve the privacy as proposed in [28]. It proposes a shared 
private/public key which is given to all of the legitimate 
vehicles. This key is renewed regularly by an authority where 
each vehicle has its own public/private key to communicate 
with the authority.  
3.2 Merging Cloud Computing with 
VANET 
Among the existing works, authors in [29] proposed a new 
concept called Vehicular Cloud (VC). VC used underutilized 
vehicle resources to form a cloud by aggregating vehicular 
computing resources. The authors considered that VC refers to 
a group of large autonomous vehicles included the computing, 
sensing, communication, and physical resources, where they 
could be coordinated and dynamically allocated to end users. 
It is worth to note that the proposed system did not take the 
advantage of the conventional cloud, and was only based on 
the vehicular resources. In contrast, VC resources cannot 
always be switched on, and often require the authorization of 
the vehicle’s owner, which can be absent if the vehicle is in a 
steady state (e.g., vehicles in a parking lot). 
Authors in [6] divided the VANET clouds into three major 
clouds: Vehicular Clouds (VCs), Vehicles using Clouds 
(VuCs) and Hybrid Clouds (HCs). The VC is subdivided into 
two categories: a static cloud which refers to stationary 
vehicles providing cloud services, and a dynamic cloud which 
is set up on the demand in an ad hoc manner. A VuC allows a 
VANET to connect to the traditional cloud with RSUs, 
whereas the HC is a combination of VC and VuC. Moreover, 
the vehicles can only interact with the traditional cloud 
through RSUs, which act as gateways. However, vehicles 
cannot be connected to the traditional cloud if the RSUs are 
not available, as in rural areas. 
Mershed and Artil in [30], addressed the problem of enabling 
the vehicles in the VANET to discover their needed services 
from the mobile cloud servers, which are moving nearby. The 
authors proposed a system called CROWN, which depends on 
the RSUs that act as cloud directories and interfaces. To 
achieve that, RSUs make their recorded data available to 
enable vehicles to discover the required cloud services within 
the area that covered by the RSU. 
To provide the safety and non-safety services in the vehicular 
applications, authors in [31] proposed the use of cloud 
computing services via RSUs. (Vehicular Cloud for Roadside) 
VCR scenarios architecture was proposed to allow vehicles to 
make benefits from the private and public vehicular cloud 
services. The previous efforts can be considered as help 
systems for vehicles, to access the conventional cloud through 
the RSUs via a cloud gateway, in order to find the requested 
cloud service without using any mobile computing resources. 
A pure cloud formed by the vehicles which has been proposed 
in [32]. It is a new service paradigm called Sensor as a Service 
(SenaaS) for the vehicle communication platforms, it makes 
their components available, including vehicle sensors and 
devices, to third-party vehicle monitoring applications, as 
cloud computing resources called sensor-cloud service. This 
proposal lacks of the use of the traditional cloud to improve 
the computing capacity which is usually requested by 
vehicles. 
To deal with the issue of the vehicles avoiding obstacles, a 
cloud-assisted system for autonomous driving was proposed 
in [33] and called Carcel. Carcel is a system that enables the 
cloud to collect information from the autonomous vehicle 
sensors as well as from the roadside infrastructure, to help 
vehicles avoiding obstacles, such as pedestrians and other 
vehicles, which may not be directly detected by the sensors on 
the vehicle.  
Authors in [34] addressed the issue of seamless access to the 
Internet by making the use of cloud-based VANETs. In this 
study, the authors proposed a cloud-supported gateway model, 
which is called Gateway as a Service (GaaS), in order to 
provide an efficient gateway connectivity and to enhance the 
Internet usage experience for the vehicular networks.  
3.3 VANET-cloud security 
Authors in [35] dealt with the cloud security issue for 
vehicular networks by proposing a new secure provisioning 
model called Vehicle-to Cloud (V2C). V2C is composed of a 
provisioning infrastructure, which links two levels, the 
automobile user and the infrastructure provider. In the 
proposed model, the authors integrated three security modules 
to enhance the security, an authentication module, an 
authorization and access control policies module and an 
assurance module. The authentication module manages the 
identities and authenticates the entities in V2C. The 
authorization and access control policies modules set the 
access control policies for every automobile user. To correlate 
management actions with the desired requirements, the 
assurance module is deployed throughout V2C. 
V2Cfocuseson the cloud services required by the automobile 
users, and is served via the traditional cloud. This proposal is 
not satisfy the privacy preservation and the other security 
requirements in the VANET. 
— GeoEncrypt (Geolock) in the VANETs has been proposed in 
[36]. The idea is to use the geographic location of a vehicle to 
generate a secret key. Messages are encrypted with the secret 
key, and the encoded texts are sent to the receiving vehicles. 
The receiving vehicles must be physically presented in a 
certain geographic region specified by the sender, to be able to 
decrypt the message. They are proposed as a future work to 
integrate this model into security methods, and the shape of 
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the decryption region will be extended from the square shape 
to any shape in a professional manner. 
Authors in [37], considered the concept of VuC framework 
and proposed another layer named TIaaS (Traffic Information 
as a Service) on the top of the Cloud Computing Stack. The 
service offers fine-grained traffic information for all the 
vehicles which are subscribed to TIaaS from the Cloud. The 
authors have proposed the Geolock-based encryption to 
provide the security, privacy and the conditional anonymity. 
S. Mallisseryet. Al. in [38], have proposed the Cloud Enabled 
Secure Communication in the VANET as a method to classify 
the VANET's messages. In addition, the vehicles and the RSU 
use the cloud as the medium of storage.  This proposed 
algorithm verifies the identity and authenticity of the vehicles 
and messages exchanged. The message exchanged and 
certificates used in VANET are encrypted by using the 
geolocation key of the RSU. The use of geolocation key 
provides a location confidentiality against vehicles outside. 
This method does not satisfy the authorization, privacy, non-
repudiation, availability and the revocation. 
S. Olariuet. al. in [39] illustrates the power of the VC concept 
by enumerating a numerous application scenarios, for 
example, Remote Configuration and Car Performance 
Checking, Big traffic data analysis, Smart location-based 
advertisements and Vehicle Witnesses.  The authors have 
emphasized more research challenges in the vehicular cloud 
including security issues. 
Another work in [40] proposed that the cloud is associated 
with a number of grids. A city or traffic area is partitioned into 
grids. The grid size is predefined with two GPS coordinates. 
Each cell is associated with a virtual machine in the cloud. 
The virtual machine can dynamically requests resources from 
the cloud. Therefore, the traffic of the whole city can be 
mapped to the cloud. The customized security protocols can 
be configured and replaced in the VSecurity module.  
Authors in [41] proposed a protocol to ensure both the 
message authentication and the privacy preservation. The 
proposed scheme is based on a secure elliptic curve digital 
signature algorithm approach. Here, the authors have 
considered that the transport authority is sending all the 
vehicle registration details to the RSU. This can be considered 
as an invasion of privacy on the vehicular users. 
J. Serna et al. [42] proposed the basis of privacy mechanism 
that uses an authorization paradigm based on a Mandatory 
Access Control model, and a novel mechanism that 
propagates trust information based on a vehicles geolocation. 
With the change of the geographical location, the trust 
information is passed to a new regional CA. The authors have 
considered that the geographic location change happens only 
when a vehicle crosses the border of another country. 
4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN 
VANET 
VANET should be protected against attacks by a security 
model. VANET security model should satisfy the following 
requirements and attributes as mentioned in [43] and [44]. 
1. Authentication 
The identity of a vehicle should be verified to determine if it 
is a legitimate vehicle or not. Thus, the sender should 
authenticate each message before sending it. This prevents the 
intruders from sending false messages. 
2. Authorization 
Authorization establishes what each entity (vehicle, RSU and 
etc) is allowed to do in the system, e.g. the types of messages 
could be sent, information update rules and the protocols that 
are allowed to execute. 
3. Data Integrity 
Message integrity is very important. If a received message 
was altered by an attacker, the receiver should be able to 
detect it. Therefore, it is not enough to get a message from a 
legitimate sender but also the message itself should be 
verified. In addition, this requirement should detect the 
message repetition by an attacker. 
4. Non-repudiation 
A misbehaving vehicle may send incorrect information where 
the vehicle itself is legitimate, and the message is consistent. 
This behavior may lead to bad situations like accidents. The 
sender should not deny that he sent that message, so it should 
add a liability to the user of the messages which he sent. 
5. Privacy 
Drivers want to protect their identities from others. This is a 
very critical requirement. However, the problem is that the 
privacy conflicts with the authentication and non-repudiation 
concepts. Hence, many researches try to solve that problem. 
6. Availability 
The system should be available all the time because the 
disconnection for a short time may be dangerous. The system 
should be protected against the Denial of Service (DoS) 
Attack. This attack may be done by jamming the 
communication channel. Also, the availability includes these 
methods which ensure the authorities are available and should 
trust each other when a vehicle moves from a region to 
another. 
7. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a vital attribute to keep the content of the 
message secret if needed. 
8. Entity Revocation 
The ability to revoke the vehicles or the authorities is very 
important. For example, when a vehicle engages in malicious 
activity, it must be revoked.  
5. PROPOSED VANET SECURITY AS A 
SERVICE (VSAAS) 
5.1 VSaaS Architecture  
Our work proposes VSaaS framework model to manage the 
security services in the VANET based on the cloud, and 
provide a secure VANET communication between the 
different entities, e.g. vehicles, authorities and etc. This 
framework model consists of different modules as shown in 
figure 1: 
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Figure1: VANET Security as a Service (VSaaS) 
1. Certified Authority (CA): this module is the main one in 
the VSaaS because it is responsible for: 
 Vehicles and Authorities Registration.  
 Key Management mechanisms, to generate keys for 
different entities and renew these keys when they 
become expired.  
 Authenticate the vehicles and their information 
messages, and authenticate the authorities that interacting 
with the VSaaS.  
 Vehicle identity identification mechanism to preserve the 
privacy, and enable the traceability done only by the 
trusted authorities that have a permission to track 
vehicles.  
2. Security Access List (ACL): this module is responsible 
for:  
 Allowing/denying the inter-actions that will be done 
between the different entities (vehicles, authorities, 
VSaaS modules).  
 Allowing/denying the intra-actions that will be done 
between the modules within VSaaS. 
3. Vehicle Revocation Module (VRM): this module is 
divided into two parts: detecting sub-module and revoking 
sub-module. The first one should be constructed by some 
algorithms to detect a misbehaved vehicle (this part is out of 
our scope). The second part is responsible for revoking a 
misbehaved vehicle when detected.  
4. VIMs Processing Module (VPM): this module is 
responsible for processing the Vehicle Information Messages 
(VIMs), which are sent by the vehicles as coarse-information 
messages and constructing fine-information messages, which 
called Traffic Information Messages (TIMs).  
5. TIMs Dissemination Module (TDM): this module is 
responsible for disseminating the TIMs to the vehicles based 
on their locations.  
6. Databases: this module stores different types of data as: 
 Keys Database (KDB): which is used to store different 
types of keys such as the CA public/private keys and the 
TDM's shared secret key. This database is managed by 
CA.  
 Vehicles Database (VDB): which is used to store all the 
vehicles information and their keys. This database is 
managed by the CA.  
 Authorities Database (ADB): which is used to store all 
the authorities’ information and their keys. This database 
is managed by the CA.  
 Vehicle Information Messages Database (VIDB): 
which is used to store the VIMs. This database is 
managed by the CA. VPM and VRM have their 
permission to access this database.  
 Traffic Information Messages Database (TIDB): 
which is used to store the TIMs. This database is 
managed by VPM. TDM has its permission to access this 
database.  
 Cellular Towers Database (CTDB): which is used to 
store all the cellular towers information, their coordinates 
and routes. This database is managed by system 
administrators. TDM has its permission to access this 
database.  
 Event Viewer Database (EVDB): which is used to store 
all the events within the VSaaS framework model. 
System administrators and different modules have a 
permission to access this database especially for some 
reporting issues. 
5.2 Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs) 
and Traffic Information Messages 
(TIMs) 
In the traditional VANET, safety messages are the messages 
or the beacons which are broadcasted by vehicles, to warn the 
other vehicles about the traffic situations like congestions and 
collisions. These messages contain information like location, 
speed, direction and acceleration. These messages are sent 
into the forms of the V2V and V2I communications. Hence, 
these messages are divided into two types: periodic and event 
driven messages, which are sent when a hazardous situation 
occurs. Periodic messages are considered to be an important 
type of messages that supports a decision that has been taken 
in the safety applications. Periodic messages are broadcasted 
to surrounding vehicles, but it may leads to a wasted 
bandwidth consumption, especially in the dense environment, 
in addition to increasing the probability of a storm problem 
occurring.  
This work proposes the VIMs, which are shaped in a form of 
V2Cloud communication, as an alternative of the safety 
messages which are shaped in a form of V2V and V2I. VIMs 
include the current position, speed, direction, timestamp and 
the heading information, which are sent directly to the cloud 
infrastructure, and stored in the Vehicle Information Database 
(VIDB) if they were authenticated by the CA. Also, this work 
proposes the vehicles which will send asynchronous VIMs 
when the change in parameters exceeds a certain percentage 
(needs more experiments to determine it), or when the 
hazardous conditions are occurred. Other Modules in the 
VSaaS may have a permission to access the VIDB, such as the 
VPM which is made to process the VIMs, and construct fine-
grained information which called Traffic Information 
Messages (TIMs). TIMs will be stored in the Traffic 
Information Database (TIDB). TDM module disseminates the 
TIMs to the vehicles based on their location. 
In addition, this work proposes a Message Type (MT) field in 
each VANET message sent in the V2Cloud between the 
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different entities. MT is chosen to be a value of 32-bit length. 
MT is used to identify each message e.g. who is the sender 
and receiver of the message? And what is the aim of the 





















5.3 Vehicle Entity in VSaaS 
Before giving vehicle N a license to work, it should be 
registered in the CA by taking its physical Vehicle 
Identification Number (VIN) in some ways, to ensure that the 
VIN is true. VIN consists of 17 digits [45] and was officially 
described in ISO standard 3779 in February 1977, and revised 
at last in 1983. CA extracts all the vehicle's information from 
this VIN. Also, the owner's information should be given. 
Then, CA generates the Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIDN) and the public/private keys (PubN, PrvN) for the 
vehicle N. In our work, VIDN is chosen to be a value of 64-bit 
length. This length can present more than 18 billion of values. 
May be other values can be used. The public/private keys 
(PubN, PrvN) have a long lifetime (a year for example). When 
a vehicle renews its license, the CA will generate and install 
new keys on the vehicle. 
Each vehicle has a Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) installed by 
the manufacturer, to store all the secret information used in 
VANET. CA preinstalls the (PubN, PrvN) and PubCA on each 
vehicle N's TDP in addition to the VIDN. Hence, CA has 
public/private keys (PubCA, PrvCA). The public and private 
keys for vehicles and the CA are generated according to the 
public-key cipher algorithms RSA. Also, the (PubCA, PrvCA) 
was considered to have a medium lifetime (a month for 
example). When CA's public and private keys are renewed, 
CA broadcasts the CAKeyUpdateforVehicle message to all 
the vehicles which contain the new PubCA. Vehicles that did 
not receive the CAKeyUpdateforVehicle message according 
to different reasons, can send a 
VehicleRequestCAKeyUpdate message to request the new 
PubCA. 
For liability, vehicles' identities should be added to the 
vehicles' messages, but this requirement contradicts with the 
privacy. Therefore, vehicles' identities should be hidden 
(encrypted) from the others, only CA can identify the vehicles' 
identities. To solve it, CA generates a symmetric key called 
Privacy Key KPRIV used to encrypt/decrypt the vehicles' 
identities. All the registered (trusted) vehicles have the same 
privacy key KPRIV. This key has a medium lifetime (a month 
for example). The key size is selected to be 128-bit, which is a 
common size for the symmetric ciphers AES. KPRIV is 
preinstalled on the vehicle N's TDP when the vehicle N is 
registered with CA. It is worth to mention that the privacy key 
KPRIV provides authentication and privacy. Authentication is 
achieved because only the registered and trusted vehicles have 
this privacy key KPRIV. Using the same privacy key KPRIV by 
all the vehicles at the same time to authenticate the messages 
or a part of them, provides anonymity which achieved the 
privacy.  
When the vehicle N sends a message or requests different 
keys from the CA, TDP will add Encrypted VID (EVID). 
EVID value is produced by concatenating the VIDN to the 
current reading (xy-coordinates) from the tamper GPS 
installed by the manufacturer, then encrypting the all with the 
privacy key KPRIV. Show algorithms in table 2. EVID value is 
a portion of any message sent to the CA, where the entire 
message should be encrypted by the PubCA. As a result, only 
CA can decrypt the message by its private key PrvCA. 
Concatenating the xy with the VIDN before encryption, should 
ensure that the EVID value must be different in each message, 
and mitigates the linking between the two messages generated 
from the same vehicle. 
Table2: Algorithms to Hide/Identify Vehicle Identity 
Algorithm: Hiding Vehicle Identity 
Input: VIDN 
Output: Encrypted VIDN (EVID) 
1. Read xy-coordinates from Tamper GPS 
2. EVID = Encsym(VIDN || xy, KPRIV) 
3. Return EVID 
Algorithm: Identifying Vehicle Identity 
Input: Encrypted VIDN (EVID) 
Output: VIDN 
1. VIDN || xy = Decsym (EVID, KPRIV) 
2. Extract VIDN 
3.Return VIDN 
 
To send secure VIMs, vehicle N's TDP concatenates the 
message (m), the message type (MT), the time stamp (t) and 
the EVID together. Then encrypting the all by the CA's public 
key PubCA to form a secure VIM. Vehicles send secure VIMs 
to the CA to verify and authenticate them.  CA receives the 
secure VIMs and decrypts them by its private key PrvCA. CA 
validates the time stamp (t) and extracts the EVID to 
authenticate the Vehicle Identity VIDN. If (t) and (VIDN) are 
valid, CA extracts the message (m) and stores it in the VIDB. 
VPM processes VIMs to construct fine-grained information, 
which called Traffic Information Messages (TIMs), and stores 
them in the TIDB. TDM gets TIM and concatenates it to (t) 
and (MT), then encrypts the all by a symmetric shared key 
called Dissemination Key KD to form the secure TIMs. After 
that, TDM determines the route of the TIMs based on the 
location of the cellular towers coordinates, which are stored in 
a Cellular Tower Database (CTDB) to disseminate them. 
Vehicles that receive the secure TIMs, decrypt them by the 
Dissemination Key (KD) and verify time stamp (t) to get the 
TIM. Show Algorithms in table 3.      
When the vehicle N is registered with the CA, it preinstalls 
the KD on the vehicle N's TDP in addition to the previous 
secret information: (PubN, PrvN), PubCA, VIDN and KPRIV. 
This key has a short lifetime (a day for example). The key size 
is selected to be 128-bit which the common size is for the 
symmetric ciphers AES. When the CA renews the KD, it 
broadcasts the DissKeyUpdate message, which contains the 
new Dissemination Key (KD) to all the vehicles. Vehicles that 
did not receive the DissKeyUpdate message because of the 
Table1: Examples of Messages in V2Cloud and VSaaS 
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different reasons, can request the new Dissemination Key. In 
addition to that, CA will pass the new key to the DTM. 
Hence, when the CA sends the new KD, it is signed by the 
CA's private key to ensure the CA authentication, and 
encrypted by the key KPRIV, to achieve the confidentiality and 
vehicles authentication. In addition, KD is a shared symmetric 
key which is better in the performance.  
Table3: Algorithms to send VIMs and Disseminate TIMs 
Algorithm: Sending Secure Vehicle Information 
Message (VIM) 
Input: Vehicle Information Message m  and VIDN 
Output: secure VIM 
1.Get current timestamp t 
2. Set Message Type (MT)=8 
3. EVID = Hiding Vehicle Identity Algorithm (VIDN) 
4. M = m || t || MT || EVID  
5. secure VIM = Encpub (M, PubCA)  
6.Return secure VIM 
Algorithm:  CA Verifying Secured Vehicle 
Information Message (VIM) 
Input: secure VIM 
Output: Vehicle Information Message m and VIDN, or null 
1. M = Decprv (secure VIM, PrvCA) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. VIDN = Identifying Vehicle Identity Algorithm (EVID)  
6. If VIDN is false, then return null and stop 
7. Extract m from M  
8. Return m and VIDN 
9. Store all information into VIDB. 
Algorithm: TDM Disseminating Secure Traffic 
Information Message (TIM) 
Input: Traffic Information Message m   
Output: secure TIM and route 
1.Get current timestamp t 
2. Set Message Type (MT)=9 
4. M = m || t || MT  
5. secure TIM = Encsym (M, KD)  
6. Determine the route for this TIM based on the location of 
cellular towers coordinates stored in CTDB. 
7.Return secure TIM and route 
Algorithm: Vehicle Verifying Secured Traffic 
Information Message (TIM) 
Input: secure TIM 
Output: Traffic Information Message m or null 
1. M = Decsym (secure TIM, KD) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
6. Extract m from M  
7. Return m  
 
All the messages in the VANET environment should be 
protected against the replay attack. This protection is achieved 
by adding the time information to the message which is called 
timestamp (t). When the vehicle or the CA receives a 
message, it will check the validity of its timestamp (t). TDP 
has an internal clock .TDP is responsible for adding 
timestamps to the message before sending them in addition to 
check the validity of timestamps in the received messages. 
5.4 Vehicle Revocation 
When a misbehaved vehicle is detected, it should be revoked 
by Vehicle Revocation Module (VRM). The algorithm which 
determines the misbehaved vehicle, is out of our work scope. 
This work aimed to design a security model framework for the 
(V2Cloud). 
In the previous works, where there is no general VANET 
security model framework, each vehicle should have a 
Revocation Key List, and check if the received messages were 
generated by the trusted vehicles or not. This was done by 
different approaches, but these approaches had many issues. 
For example, it needs a large storage space at each vehicle. 
Moreover, including more parameters or keys in the safety 
messages, leads to larger message size, and needs more 
computations to verify the messages at the receiver side. In 
addition, the need of searching in a very huge number of keys, 
costs more time. 
In our work, CA is receiving all vehicle messages and storing 
them in the VIDB. VRM is divided into two parts: detecting 
sub-module and revoking sub-module. The first one should be 
constructed by some algorithms to detect the misbehaved 
vehicle (this part is out of our scope). This sub-module has its 
permission to access the VIDB to check the behavior and 
messages of the vehicles, in order to detect any misbehaved 
vehicle. If it was detected, the second part, which is 
responsible for revoking the misbehaved vehicle, changes the 
vehicle status to invalid, and create the revoked report (RR) 
that indicates to why the vehicle will be revoked. Then, CA 
will send a killVehicle message to that vehicle. This message 
includes RR which is signed by the CA's private key (PrvCA), 
to ensure that the message is generated by the CA. After that, 
concatenate the signed RR with the Message Type (MT), 
timestamps (t), and encrypt all of them by the vehicle's public 
key PubN, to ensure that only the misbehaved vehicle N can 
decrypt this message by its private key PrvN. When the 
misbehaved vehicle N receives the killVehicle message and 
decrypts it, the vehicle's TDP checks the validity of 
timestamps and verifies the signed revoked report part by the 
CA's public key PubCA. Finally, vehicle N's TDP will stop 
working and erase all the secret information. Show algorithms 
in table 4. 
Table4: Algorithms to Revoke Vehicles 
Algorithm: CA Sending Revoked Message to Vehicle 
N  
Input: VIDN and revoke report RR  
Output: KillVehicle message  
1. Get current timestamp  
2. Set Message Type (MT)=7  
3. SignRR = Signprv(RR, PrvCA)  
4. M = t || MT || SignRR 
5. KillVehcile = Encpub(M, PubN)  
6. Return KillVehcile 
Algorithm: Vehicle N Receiving Revoked Message  
Input: KillVehicle 
Output: N'TDP turn-off or null  
1. M = Decprv (KillVehcile, PrvN)  
2. Extract MT from M  
3. Extract timestamp t from M  
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop  
5. VerifySignpub(SignRR, PubCA) = false, then return null and 
stop  
6. Erase all keys and turn off TDP  
5.5 Authority Entity in VSaaS 
This work classifies the authorities which are registered with 
the CAs into three different types according to their 
permission:  
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 Traceability Authority (TA) which has a permission to 
track the vehicle identity and location.  
 Transportation and Traffic Monitor Authority 
(TTMA) which has a permission to monitor and analyze 
the transport traffic, depending on the information 
recorded in the TIDB.  
 Manufacturers which have a permission to provide all 
the firmware updates, and check the vehicle performance 
remotely, depending on the sensor messages which are 
sent periodically by the vehicle itself. (This part is out of 
our work scope). 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) mechanism was proposed 
to connect these authorities with the VSaaS. The 
governmental body, which manages the VSaaS, defines the 
authority M by giving the CA all the authority's information, 
such as (name, type, address, telephone number, contact 
person, email, IP address and permissions). The CA generates 
the Authority Identification Number (AIDM) which is chosen 
to be a value of 16-bit length. And by this length, more than 
65000 of the values can be presented.  May be other values 
can be used. Also, CA generates the authority's public-private 
keys pair (PubM, PrvM). The public and private keys are 
generated according to the public-key cipher algorithms RSA. 
Also, the (PubM, PrvM) was considered to have a long lifetime 
(a year for example). Finally, CA generates the secret shared 
key KSM that will be used to exchange the information and 
messages between the authority M and the VSaaS modules 
such as CA. The key KSM's size is selected to be 128-bit, 
which is the common size for the symmetric ciphers AES. 
This key has a medium lifetime (a month for example). Each 
authority has a local security process (SP), which has a 
specific identifier SPID chosen to be a value of 16-bit length. 
And by this length, more than 65000 of the values can be 
presented. May be other values can be used. The local SP is 
responsible for interacting with the VSaaS modules in a 
secure way. Hence, the current PubCA and Authority 
Identification Number (AIDM) have been given locally to the 
authority M when the site has been installed. 
To register the authority, the new authority generates a 
temporary symmetric key KTMP used only in the registration 
process (used for one time). The key size is selected to be 
128-bit which the common size is for the symmetric ciphers 
AES. The new authority sends an AuthorityRegister message 
to the CA where the message consists of MT, t, AIDM and 
KTMP. Then, encrypting the all by the CAs' public key PubCA 
to ensure that only the CA can decrypt this message. When 
CA received the AuthorityRegister message, CA decrypts it 
by its private key PrvCA. Then, it validates the timestamp (t). 
After that, the CA extracts the AIDM and the temporary 
symmetric key KTMP to validate them. Finally, the CA forms 
the OkRegister message that consists of MT, t and a signed 
part which consists of the PubM, PrvM, SPID and the KSM 
which also are signed by the PrvCA, then encrypting the all by 
KTMP. When the authority M receives the OkRegister 
message, it decrypts OkRegister message by the temporary 
symmetric key KTMP, and verifies the signed portion by the 
PubCA to ensure that all the secret keys and information are 
generated by the CA. Then, authority M stores all the secret 
keys and information which are sent by the CA and it also 
erases the KTMP. Now, authority M creates a local security 
process SP with SPID to interact with the CA in a secure way. 
Authority M' SP forms ACKAuthorityRegister message that 
consists of the MT and t. This message is encrypted by KSM. 
Finally, the CA verifies the ACKAuthorityRegister message, 
and erases the KTMP and be ready to exchange the messages 
with authority M. Show algorithm in table5. Moreover, 
authorities can request a new CA's public key and a shared 
key KSM when they are expired. 
Table5: Authority Registration Algorithms 
Algorithm: Authority Sending Registration Request  
Input: PubCA and AIDM 
Output: AuthorityRegister message 
1.Authority generates temporary symmetric key KTMP 
2. Message Type =10 
3. Get current timestamp t 
4. M =MT || t || AIDM || KTMP 
5. AuthorityRegister = Encpub (M, PubCA) 
6. Return AuthorityRegister 
Algorithm: CA Receiving Authority Registration 
Request and Sending Security Information to 
Authority 
Input: AuthorityRegister 
Output: OkRegister or null 
1. M = Decprv (AuthorityRegister, PrvCA) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. CA Extracts AIDM and KTMP. 
6. CA Validates AIDM = false, then return null and stop  
7. CA set Message Type =11 
8. Get current timestamp t 
9. SignokRegister= Signprv((PubM, PrvM) || SPID || KSM , 
PrvCA) 
10. M = MT || t || SignokRegister 
11. OKRegister = Encsym (M, KTMP). 
12. Return OKRegister to authority M 
Algorithm: Authority Receiving Security 
Information from CA and send back ACK 
Input: okRegister 
Output: ACKAuthorityRegister message or null 
1. M = Decsym (okRegister, KTMP) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. VerifySignpub (SignokRegister, PubCA) = false, then return 
null and stop 
6. Extract and Store Security Information: (PubM, PrvM) || 
SPID || KSM 
7. Erase temporary symmetric key KTMP 
8.Authority creates local security process with SPID 
9. M' SP set Message Type =12 
10. Get current timestamp t 
11. M =MT || t  
12. ACKAuthorityRegister = Encsym (M, KSM) 
13. Return ACKAuthorityRegister 
 
If any authority is compromised, CA will send a 
killAuthority message to this authority to destroy M' local 
security process and erase all the keys. The compromised 
authority needs to register again with the CA according to the 
governmental security rules. 
Traceability Authority (TA) is an authority which has a 
permission to track the vehicle identity and location. Today, 
tracking vehicles depends on the Vehicle Identification 
Number (VIDN). Vehicle Information Messages (VIMs) are 
stored in the (VIDB) that is managed by CA. To track vehicle 
N, TA should have a permission to access the required fields 
from the VIDB's records such as VIDN, xy-coordinates, speed 
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and etc. When TA has an order to track the vehicle N, which 
has the VIDN, TA's local security process SP will send a 
Track message to the CA, which consists of the MT, t, AIDM 
and the VIDN, then encrypting the all by the PubCA, to ensure 
that only the CA can decrypt this message. When the CA 
receives this message, it decrypts the message by the CA' 
private key and check the validity of the t, then, extracts the 
AIDM and the VIDN to verify them. 
The CA informs the TA by the startTracking message to 
start tracking vehicle N. This message includes (MT, t and 
VIDN) encrypted by the TA's public key to ensure that only 
the TA can decrypt this message. When TA receives this 
message, its local security process starts to query and access 
all the needed information to track the vehicle N. Hence, the 
CA and authority TA' SP are using the shared secret key 
(KSM) to encrypt all the traffics between them, to track the 
vehicle N through its VIDN. A symmetric key encryption was 
proposed because it is more efficient and faster than the 
public/private keys. When the TA completes the tracking 
order, it sends a stopTracking message to the CA. Show 
algorithms in table 6. 
Table6: Algorithms to Track Vehicle N by TA  
Algorithm: TA Sending Request to CA to Track 
Vehicle N  
Input: VIDN and AIDM 
Output: Track message 
1. Get current timestamp t 
2. Message Type =18 
3. M =MT || t || AIDM || VIDN 
4. Track = Encpub(M, PubCA) 
5. Return Track 
Algorithm: CA Receiving Track Vehicle N Request 
from TA 
Input: Track 
Output: startTracking or null 
1. M = Decprv (Track, PrvCA) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. AIDM = false, then return null and stop  
6. VIDN = false, then return null and stop 
7. CA set Message Type =19 
8. Get current timestamp t 
9. M = MT || t || VIDN 
10. startTracking = Encpub(M, PubTA) 
11. Return startTracking 
Algorithm: TA Receiving Start Tracking Vehicle N 
Input: startTracking 
Output: TA' local security process can access information in 
VIDB in secure way 
1. M = Decprv (startTracking, PrvTA) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. TA' local security process can access information in VIDB 
in secure way using shared secret key (KSM)  
Algorithm: TA Sending Stop Tracking Vehicle N to 
CA 
Input: VIDN 
Output: stopTracking or null 
1. Message Type =20 
2. Get current timestamp t 
3. M = MT || t || VIDN 
4. StopTracking = Encpub(M, PubCA) 
5. Return StopTracking 
Algorithm: CA Receiving Stop Tracking Vehicle N 
Input: stopTracking 
Output:  
1. M = Decprv(StopTracking, PrvCA) 
2. Extract MT from M 
3. Extract timestamp t  from M 
4. If t is invalid, then return null and stop 
5. The mission was completed 
 
Transportation and Traffic Monitor Authority (TTMA) is the 
authority which has a permission to monitor and analyze the 
transportation traffic by depending on the information 
recorded in the TIDB. Therefore, the TTMA has a permission 
to read the information from the TIDB through the authority 
local security process. These information may contain the 
VIDN if the authority has a traceability permission, and it 
contain encrypted VIDN if the authority has not this 
permission. Moreover, the information forwarded from the 
CA to the TTMA should be encrypted by the secret shared 
key KSM. The TTMA gets the secret shared key KSM in the 
registration process. 
5.6 Security Access List (ACL) 
This module represents a set of permissions and rules to 
Allow/deny the inter-actions between the different entities 
(vehicles, authorities, VSaaS modules), and the intra-actions 
between the modules within the VSaaS. Our design of the 
VSaaS is modular. In the future, any type of the authorities, 
databases, new VSaaS's modules, can be easily and smoothly 
added to make specific tasks by defining its permissions, to 
interact with the different entities, databases and modules in 
the VSaaS.  Table 7 shows the simple shape of the entities and 
modules permission against the different databases. Also, 
table 8 shows a simple way to define a permission for each 
authority according to its functions. 
Table 7: Example of entities and modules permission 
Module/ 
Database 
KDB VDB ADB VIDB TIDB CTBD 
CA Full Full Full Full  Read 
VRM  Read  Read  Read 
VPM  Read  Read Full Read 
TDM     Read Read 
TA 
Authority 
 Read  Read  Read 
TTMA 
Authority 
    Read Read 







1 0 0 
003zzz7654
9fagh2 
0 1 0 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
This paper highlighted a number of previous related works 
which proposed the VANET security, merging the Cloud 
Computing with the VANET and the VANET-cloud security.  
Also, it proposed VANET based on the cloud (V2Cloud) and 
the design of a security model framework that is hosted on the 
cloud to manage the security services, and provide a secure 
VANET communication between the different entities e.g. 
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vehicles, authorities and etc. This security model framework 
is called VANET Security as a Service (VSaaS).  
This paper showed that the VSaaS fulfilled the VANET's 
security requirements and protected the VANET against the 
different types of attacks. The implementation and the security 
analysis of our architecture along with the results of the 
performance will present in the second paper, to measure the 
security overhead of the secure Vehicle Information Messages 
(VIMs), which is sent by the vehicles to the cloud as a coarse-
grained information 
The VSaaS framework model is secure, efficient, modular, 
managed by cloud, resistant against attacks and fulfills the 
security requirements. 
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